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The Obama Administration’s 
Clean Air Act Legacy and the 
UNFCCC 
Uma Outka 
In the face of a gridlock Congress, hopes for comprehensive 
climate legislation were dashed early in President Obama’s first 
term. U.S. leadership in international climate policy had been 
seriously undermined in ways, he soon learned, were not easily 
repaired. The President’s engagement with climate issues, to 
many observers, seemed slow and inconsistent, but deepened 
rhetorically and substantively in the second term with a decisive 
focus on existing statutory authority, looking most importantly 
to the Clean Air Act as a vehicle for greenhouse gas regulation. 
This essay situates the Obama Administration’s Clean Air Act 
regulatory agenda in the context of longstanding domestic 
obligations of signatories to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change as well as positioning for the 
2015 Conference of the Parties in Paris.  
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In the early days of the Obama Administration, comprehensive 
climate change legislation was taking shape on the horizon. Years of 
inaction on greenhouse gas emissions by the United States was, many 
hoped, nearing an end. Yet the new President Obama soon found 
himself facing a Congress quick to oppose his initiatives across a 
spectrum of issues, and climate change seemed to take a back seat to 
other important concerns. In the second term, however, the 
Administration renewed its focus on climate change. In June of 2013, 
the President announced a new Climate Action Plan at Georgetown 
University – “a plan to cut carbon pollution; a plan to protect our 
country from the impacts of climate change; and a plan to lead the 
 
 Associate Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. A special 
thanks is due to Juscelino Colares for organizing a climate-focused panel 
for this Symposium, and to Jason Vigil and Nicholas Birdsong, who 
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world in a coordinated assault on a changing climate.”1 As the 
“world’s largest economy and second largest carbon emitter,” the 
President acknowledged, the U.S. has “a unique responsibility.”2 
A single statute—the Clean Air Act—provides critical executive 
authority for advancing the President’s climate change goals. The 
Clean Air Act of 1970 was the first comprehensive federal 
environmental regulatory program.3 Today, it remains the primary 
federal environmental law that controls air pollution from mobile 
sources, like cars and trucks, and from stationary sources, like 
factories, refineries, and power plants.  
The pressure of growing climate concerns worldwide, and 
continued congressional gridlock at home, escalated the importance of 
the Clean Air Act’s potential for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
Under the Obama Administration, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) proposed a suite of regulations that implement the 
Clean Air Act for this purpose.4 As this essay will explain, these 
regulations are significant in both domestic and international 
registers. Under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the United States and nearly every other nation in 
the world has declared a common goal and shared commitment to 
averting catastrophic climate change. The complicated history of the 
U.S. role in this treaty and its implementation forms an important 
backdrop to the Administration’s second-term approach to domestic 
climate action. This approach has been multi-faceted, combining 
regulatory action by federal agencies with executive orders and 
bilateral talks, but it is the Clean Air Act—my focus here—that 
hinges the domestic and international aspects of the Administration’s 
climate mitigation strategy. Understanding the Clean Air Act’s role is 
especially important now that all eyes are on the U.S. and other 
major emitting countries to achieve the goals outlined in a new 
international agreement penned at the close of 2015 in Paris, France 
 
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change 
(June 25, 2013, 1:45 PM) (transcript available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-
president-climate-change [https://perma.cc/5879-JQ48]). 
2. Id. Although the U.S. is currently the second largest annual carbon 
emitter, behind China, the US is still the largest historical emitter in the 
world. See generally, NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, GLOBAL CARBON 
ATLAS, available at http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report 
[http://perma.cc/Q5XN-XJQB] (summarizing the impact of climate 
change of the United States).  
3. Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
4. EPA Greenhouse Gas Regulation FAQ, CTR. CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, available at 
http://www.c2es.org/federal/executive/epa/greenhouse-gas-regulation-
faq [http://perma.cc/DBM9-T589]. 
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by the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the Framework 
Convention.5 
In what follows, this essay situates the Administration’s ambitious 
Clean Air Act regulatory agenda in the context of domestic 
obligations of signatories to the Framework Convention and in 
relation to positioning for COP21. The essay closes with some early 
perspectives on the Administration’s legacy for the Clean Air Act and 
climate change policy. 
I. The UNFCC, Domestic Obligations, and the Early 
Obama Administration 
The U.S. was among the first nations to sign the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, 
marking a landmark international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions to mitigate global climate change.6 For every U.S. 
president following President George H.W. Bush, who signed the 
Convention, the UNFCC has provided the formal structure for 
international dialogue and policy negotiations on climate change.  
The UNFCCC reflects the common recognition “that change in 
the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of 
humankind.”7 Parties to the Convention agreed in broad terms to the 
objective of achieving “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations 
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”8 As a signatory, 
the U.S. committed to “adopt national policies and take 
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by 
limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and 
protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”9  
 
5. See Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Draft decision-Annex /CP.21, 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BHH5-6WNM]. 
6. The UNFCCC is a near-universal treaty with 195 Parties. See Status of 
Ratification of the Convention, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION CLIMATE CHANGE, available at 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratificati
on/items/2631.php [http://perma.cc/22MB-KGLP] (listing the latest 
information concerning dates of signature and receipt of instruments of 
ratification by the Secretary-General of the United Nations). 
7. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., opened for 
signature May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
[hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
8. Id. at art. 2. 
9. Id. at art. 4.2(a). 
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Coordinating individual national commitments for effective 
implementation remains extremely challenging. In the first major 
instrument developed by the Parties for this purpose, the Kyoto 
Protocol, binding emissions reductions applied only to developed 
nations.10 Although climate stabilization ultimately will require 
emissions reductions in fast-growing developing countries as well, 
Kyoto’s contrasting obligations for developed and developing nations 
sought to capture the UNFCCC’s central tenet of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.11 The text of the treaty establishes this 
as a foremost principle for agreement:  
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.12  
The Kyoto Protocol’s structural emphasis on developed nations’ 
obligations became politically divisive in the U.S. Despite significant 
involvement with the Protocol’s design under the Clinton 
Administration, the U.S. ultimately declined to ratify it under 
President George W. Bush, due to fears that the U.S. would suffer 
economically if targets did not apply to polluting developing 
countries, namely China and India.13 This was seen as a major setback 
to the success of the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol eventually went 
into effect after a struggle to secure sufficient signatories to account 
for the U.S.’s absence, and as a result the U.S. leadership position in 
climate change negotiations was seriously undercut.14 Throughout the 
second Bush Administration, although the U.S. maintained its official 
posture of commitment to the shared aims of the UNFCCC, the U.S. 
was widely regarded as a blocking agent, no longer a facilitator, of 
international climate progress.15 
 
10. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 
I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
11. See id. at arts. 10(c), 10(e), 11.2(a), 11.2(b). 
12. UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 3.1. 
13. See CINNAMON PINON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: 
EU AND US APPROACHES 35-36 (2010) (discussing the United States’ 
role in early years of the Kyoto Protocols). 
14. See id. at 8-9 (explaining the effects of the U.S not ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocol, had on its leadership role on environmental issues). 
15. See id. at 36-37 (discussing the Bush Administration’s policy on climate 
change). 
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When Barack Obama was elected, a renewed commitment to 
climate change mitigation was among his stated priorities. 
Domestically, many thought that nationwide climate change 
legislation would be imminently forthcoming in his first term after the 
House of Representatives passed a comprehensive climate bill; but it 
did not pass in the Senate.16 In 2009, on the international stage, 
President Obama pledged the U.S. would cut GHG emissions by 17 
percent below 2005 levels by the year 2020.17 Yet his first major 
public foray into climate change negotiations, at the 2009 Conference 
of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark, ended in frustration, 
protests, and few notable successes.18 The Obama Administration’s 
subsequent role internationally on climate issues, at least for the 
remainder of his first term, had a lower profile.  
Facing intense political opposition on a range of other priorities, 
the congressional gridlock on domestic climate change policy did not 
speak well for the Administration’s prospects with new international 
commitments. The experience of the Clinton-Gore White House 
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations was a cautionary tale.19 Seeing 
no near-term potential for meaningful climate legislation, President 
Obama turned his attention to the potential for climate progress 
under existing statutory authority.20 Reflecting this reorientation 
toward executive action, the Clean Air Act (CAA) has been the focal 
point of the Obama Administration’s efforts to achieve climate change 
mitigation goals, particularly in the second term.21  
 
16. See generally id. at 54-56 (describing the Obama administration’s 
attempt to pass a bill addressing climate change). 
17. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE 
ACTION PLAN 6 (JUNE 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclima
teactionplan.pdf  [http://perma.cc/3HA6-WNCK]; see also UNFCCC, 
Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to be 
implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (June 7, 
2011), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/sb/eng/inf01r01.pdf 
[perma.cc/9VLL-7MLM] (providing a summary of the United States’ 
goals in reducing its greenhouse gas emissions). 
18. See generally Leslie G. Fields & Royce G. Brooks, President Obama and 
the New Politics of Inclusion in the Climate Change Debate, 9 FLA. A & 
M U. L. REV. 441, 449-451 (2014) (explaining the disappointment that 
climate change advocates felt in regard to the 2009 Conference). 
19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal versus Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 
31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (2007) (discussing the Clinton-Gore 
White House’s ambivalent approach after the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations). 
20. Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications 
for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 244 (2007). 
21. Justin Gillis, Obama Puts Legacy at Stake With Clean-Air Act, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 26, 2013), 
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However, the origins of the CAA’s centrality to domestic climate 
mitigation traces to before President Obama’s election to the 2007 
landmark Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA.22 In that 
case, the EPA under the second Bush Administration rejected 
petitions to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. In 
its 5-4 decision, however, the Court held that the EPA did have 
statutory authority to regulate GHGs under § 202 of the CAA and 
that the EPA’s avoidance of GHG regulation was arbitrary.23 
According to the Court, the statute required the agency to justify its 
position, if it could, with a reasoned Endangerment Finding—
essentially, a determination of whether GHGs endanger public health 
and welfare.24  
The authority recognized by the case provided the foundation for 
the Obama Administration’s substantive CAA regulatory agenda 
pertaining to GHGs. It was President Obama’s new EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson who issued the affirmative Endangerment 
Finding for GHGs from mobile sources.25 The Administration followed 
this Finding, as the CAA requires, with new regulations of vehicle 
emissions and fuel economy standards; but soon after, its regulatory 
focus expanded to include an even more significant source of GHGs 
within the energy sector: electric power plants.  
II. The Clean Air Act, Obama’s Climate Change 
Legacy, and COP21 
The only U.S. economic sector that emits more GHGs than 
transportation is the electric power industry, at thirty-one percent of 
total emissions (contrasted with twenty-seven percent for 
transportation by most recent data).26 The CAA addresses both 
sectors, under separate titles, and the post-Mass. v. EPA rule for 
vehicle emissions—the so-called Tailpipe Rule—raised questions about 
 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/science/earth/clean-air-act-
reinterpreted-would-focus-on-flexibility-and-state-level-efforts.html?_r=1 
[http://perma.cc/22Y9-BAZ9]. 
22. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-33 (2007) (holding that the 
CAA could be applied to the regulation of greenhouse gases). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Final Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 
66496, 66537 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
26. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-
2013, 24 (2015), 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/US-
GHG-Inventory-2015-Main-Text.pdf [http://perma.cc/VYC5-Q56T]. 
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whether and how that regulation affected stationary sources of 
GHGs.27  
This became a point of controversy over statutory interpretation. 
The EPA read the statute to require that once GHGs were “regulated 
pollutants” under the mobile source sections of the Act, they must be 
regulated under the stationary source permitting programs. In other 
words, the agency saw the effective date of the Tailpipe Rule as a 
trigger for stationary source regulation, affecting power plants and 
more. The problem with this reading, by the EPA’s own admission, 
was practical in nature; its literal effect was to significantly expand 
the EPA’s regulatory reach to include many more stationary sources 
than had been previously subject to Clean Air Act permitting 
obligations.28 To preserve administrative feasibility in the stationary 
source context, the EPA crafted a so-called Triggering Rule, 
explaining the perceived trigger effect of mobile source regulation of 
GHGs into the stationary source context,29 and a Tailoring Rule that 
limited this expansion by tailoring GHG regulation of stationary 
sources to the largest emitters.30  
When this trio of related rules was challenged in court, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld them all,31 but the Supreme Court delivered a mixed 
opinion in 2014’s Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, rejecting the 
Triggering and Tailoring Rules as impermissible statutory revision by 
the agency, while also reinforcing the EPA’s authority to regulate 
GHGs.32  
 
27. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324, 
25401 (May 7, 2010). 
28. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31601 (June 3, 2010) 
[hereinafter Prevention of Significant Deterioration] (explaining that 
some believe that EPA failed to take into effect the impact of its 
decision). 
29. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine 
Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting; Final Rule, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 17004, 17023 (Apr. 2, 2010) (explaining how Title V comes into 
effect on a stationary source). 
30. Prevention of Significant Deterioration, supra note 28, at 31516. 
31. See Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 
113 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding the EPA acted in a proper manner in 
regulating greenhouses gases through the CAA). 
32. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2438 (2014). Six 
petitions for certiorari were granted together to answer a single question 
presented: “Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting 
requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit 
greenhouse gases.” 
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From a climate perspective, several aspects of the opinion are 
especially noteworthy. First, the Court chose not to revisit the 
Endangerment Finding or the Tailpipe Rule, declining to reconsider 
whether GHG regulation under § 202 was justified, thus letting that 
key decision stand.33 Second, despite a forceful rebuke of EPA’s 
reading of the statute, the Court’s interpretation allowed EPA to 
proceed in regulating most large emitters.34 In rejecting the Trigger 
Rule, the Court disallowed stationary source regulation based solely 
on GHG emissions. Critically, nothing in the opinion precludes the 
EPA from imposing limits on GHGs emitted from stationary sources 
that are subject to permitting requirements anyway for other air 
pollutants: in the Court’s shorthand, “anyway” sources.35 With 
“anyway” sources accounting for over eighty percent of emitters 
covered by the Tailoring Rule, this was largely a victory for CAA 
regulation of GHGs, despite the opinion’s ring of bruising defeat.36  
Critical subsequent developments have utilized additional sources 
of regulatory authority under the CAA. Turning from the mobile 
source provisions to the stationary source permitting provisions, the 
EPA moved to regulate GHGs using § 111 New Source Performance 
Standards (NSPS). In contrast to the permitting provisions, which 
direct the EPA to apply a “best available control technology” 
standard to high-emitting sources on a facility-specific, case-by-case 
basis, § 111 sets national standards for categories of sources as a 
minimum, uniform threshold of performance.37 Under § 111(b), the 
EPA developed the first NSPS for carbon pollution from new power 
plants38 and the first NSPS for methane, a potent GHG, from new 
sources in the oil and gas industry.39 The rules will apply uniform 
 
33. Amanda C. Leiter, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: A Shot Across 
the Bow of the Administrative State, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POLICY 59, 69-70 (2014). 
34. “We conclude that EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresholds was 
impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s 
interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power to 
‘tailor’ legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous 
statutory terms.” Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2445. 
35. Id. at 2447-48 (holding it permissible for the EPA to apply BACT 
standards to “anyway” sources). 
36. Id. at 2438-39. 
37. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, 
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64510, 64527 (Oct. 23, 
2015). 
38. Id. at 64512. 
39. Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources, 80 Fed. Reg. 56593 
(proposed Sept. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (prior 
NSPS covered volatile organic compounds and sulfur dioxide emissions). 
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national standards for control of these pollutants to any new sources 
within these categories. The limitation of new source regulation of 
this kind is that it does nothing to address the level of air pollution 
from existing sources, which are responsible for energy’s status as the 
highest emitting sector. To address this, the EPA developed an 
ambitious rule under the less commonly used § 111(d) to set carbon 
pollution guidelines for existing power plants.40 The new rule, known 
as the Clean Power Plan, is controversial because it sets state-specific 
goals for reducing carbon emissions in the power sector, using carbon 
emission performance rates for existing “fossil-fuel fired electric 
generating units.”41 The rule provides guidelines for implementation 
by the states, but a federal implementation plan will go into effect in 
states that fail to develop an approvable plan of their own.42 The EPA 
projects that “[w]hen the Clean Power Plan is fully in place in 2030, 
carbon pollution from the power sector will be 32 percent below 2005 
levels, securing progress and making sure it continues.”43  
This rulemaking is an essential component of the broader Climate 
Action Plan the President announced in 2013.44 The Climate Action 
Plan outlined three overarching goals: (1) to continue to accelerate 
the reduction of carbon emissions in the U.S.; (2) to help state and 
local governments prepare for the impacts of climate change; and (3) 
 
40. U.S. EPA, Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 
(released Aug. 3, 2015, not yet published in the Federal Register), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-
final-rule.pdf [http://perma.cc/KVC7-BEFK]. 
41. Id. at 9. 
42. Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Electric 
Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; 
Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64965 (proposed Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 
62, 78) available at https://federalregister.gov/a/2015-22848 
[https://perma.cc/WJQ9-2MQ9]. 
43. Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA, available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-
plan [http://perma.cc/C6WX-HBJ4]; see also Clean Power Plan: 
Taking Action on Climate Change, EPA, available at 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan [http://perma.cc/L2SV-ACMC] 
(giving more details about the rule and the legal issues that it raises); 
see also Megan Herzog, Resource on the Clean Power Plan and EPA’s 
Other Rulemakings under Clean Air Act §111, LEGAL PLANET, available 
at http://legal-planet.org/2015/09/11/resources-on-the-clean-power-
plan/ [http://perma.cc/6JM9-HNEA]. 
44. See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 17 
(explaining the new rules that are being put in place and the effects that 
they will have).  
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to lead international efforts in globally reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and prepare for climate impacts.45  
The first and third goals have proven integrally connected by the 
Administration’s regulatory agenda under the CAA. Assessing that 
connection affords an opportunity to consider how this agenda 
intersects (1) with the UNFCCC’s existing framework, (2) with the 
new international agreement penned at COP21, and (3) with other 
factors that complicate the formulation of a climate change legacy for 
the Obama Administration. 
From at least the 2011 Conference in Durban, South Africa, to 
the 20th Conference of the Parties in Lima, Peru, in 2014, Parties to 
the UNFCCC have turned their attention to models for international 
cooperation that avoid the stark categories employed in the Kyoto 
Protocol.46 In Lima, the Parties confirmed the intention to adopt a 
new protocol at COP21 in Paris: “another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to 
all Parties.”47 The Conference further signaled the move away from 
categorical national roles under a future agreement by underscoring 
“its commitment to reaching an ambitious agreement in 2015 that 
reflects that principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities, in light of different national 
circumstances.”48 In anticipation of meeting this goal at COP21, 
Parties submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
 
45. Id. 
46. See generally Daniel Bodansky, “The Durban Platform Negotiations: 
Goals and Options” 2-3 (2012) 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bodansky_durban2_vp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XR48-DBUL] (analyzing the elements of the Durban 
Platform and the possible role that a new instrument might play) 
Bodansky highlights the “dramatic departure” in Durban “from the 
Kyoto Protocol negotiating mandate, which had categorically excluded 
any new commitments for developing countries,” and notes that the 
negotiated Durban Platform made “no reference to the principle of 
equity or the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities (CBDRRC),” nor repeated “the Convention’s 
language that developed countries should ‘take the lead’ in combating 
climate change.” Id. at 2-3.  
47. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 1-
14, 2014, Lima Call for Climate Action, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Lima Call for 
Climate Action]. This reiterated an intention already articulated in the 
Durban Platform, which had called for development of “a protocol, 
another legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the Convention applicable to all parties.” United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Establishment of 
an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
48. Lima Call for Climate Action, supra note 47, at ¶ 3. 
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(INDC) toward achieving the Convention’s core objective: 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system.”49 The Conference in Paris concluded with an 
agreement among all Parties to hold “the increase in the global 
average temperature to well below 2 [degrees Celsius] above pre-
industrial levels” or lower. To achieve this, Parties agreed “to 
undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” through domestic 
policy, agreeing that “efforts of all Parties will represent a progression 
over time, while recognizing the need to support developing country 
Parties for effective implementation” of the Agreement.50 
Increased emphasis on national autonomy leading up to the 
Conference, combined with inclusiveness across all Parties’ 
capabilities, represented a shift buoyed by momentum for an universal 
agreement. The regulatory agenda under the CAA in the U.S. helped 
build that momentum by demonstrating national effort and 
commitment.  Early in 2015, the Administration reported to the 
Convention Secretariat that, “the United States intends to achieve an 
economy-wide target of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 26-
28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its 
emissions by 28%.”51 CAA rules, including the Clean Power Plan, 
comprise six out of the eight regulatory measures identified in the 
U.S.’s INDC submission as completed or underway.52 
Although it is too soon to chart the contours of the President’s 
climate legacy, some impacts of the CAA agenda are already 
cognizable and worth noting at this early stage. Foremost among 
these is the solidification of GHG regulation under the CAA. Whether 
the Clean Power Plan sustains legal challenge will not change that 
 
49. UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 2. 
50. Adoption of the Paris Agreement arts. 2 & 3, Draft decision-Annex: 
Paris Agreement /CP.21, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/1 (Dec. 12, 2015), 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BHH5-6WNM]. 
51. US Cover Note INDC and Supporting Documents, INDC, 
http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/U
nited%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%
20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES52-
ATBZ]. 
52. Reported CAA regulatory actions include fuel economy standards for 
light-duty vehicles for model years 2012-2025 and for heavy-duty 
vehicles for model years 2014-2018, with post-2018 in progress; approved 
alternatives for and reductions in the use of high-GWP HFCs; carbon 
pollution standards for new and existing power plants; standards for 
methane emissions from landfills and the oil and gas sector. Non-CAA 
measures reported include energy conservation standards for buildings, 
appliances, and equipment under the Energy Policy Act and the Energy 
Independence and Security Act. Id. 
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fundamental point. To be sure, the outcome of pending litigation will 
bear on the President’s climate change legacy – a rejection of the rule 
by the courts would likely compromise the U.S. ability to meet its 
international commitments on the pledged timeline. For this and 
many other reasons, the legal proceedings are being closely watched 
by opponents and proponents alike.53 After the D.C. Circuit denied 
requests to stay the rule and fast-tracked the case for oral argument 
in June 2016, the Supreme Court surprised observers by granted the 
stay pending disposition of the petitions for review.54  
The Administration’s CAA work is significant in several other key 
respects, however, separate and apart from how the Clean Power Plan 
litigation resolves. First, the CAA rulemaking eroded the perception 
that congressional gridlock was an impervious barrier to climate 
progress. There are indications now across the economy that a low-
carbon turn is increasingly being seen as inevitable.55 In the months 
leading up to COP21, major companies across a range of industries 
made public statements in support of a binding climate agreement in 
Paris.56 These rules are undoubtedly a shift that can be a powerful 
force behind the technological innovation some have argued for as a 
primary response to climate change.57   
 
53. See West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Keith 
Goldman, Energy Cases to Watch in 2016, LAW360 (Dec. 24, 2015), 
https://www.crowell.com/files/20151224-Energy-Cases-To-Watch-In-
2016-Eisenstat.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MK9-NAMC] (listing the Clean 
Power Plan litigation first among “six cases that energy attorneys are 
going to be watching closely in 2016). 
54. Order (Document #1594951), West Virginia et al. v. EPA, No. 15-1363 
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016); Order in Pending Case (Document #15A773), 
West Virginia et al. v. EPA, 577 U.S. __ (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016). 
55. We Mean Business Coalition, Investors Call Upon Governments to 
Secure a Clear, Long-Term Goal at COP21, WE MEAN BUSINESS (Oct. 
11, 2015), available at 
http://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/blog/investors-call-upon-
governments-secure-clear-long-term-goal-cop21 [http://perma.cc/MJN6-
JM2M]. 
56. See Oil and gas CEOs jointly declare action on climate change, OIL & 
GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, available at 
http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/oil-and-gas-ceos-
jointly-declare-action-on-climate-change/ [http://perma.cc/5H8R-T895] 
(explaining that ten of the world’s largest oil and gas companies have 
declared their support for an effective climate change agreement.); A 
Call for Climate Action in Paris, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, available at http://www.c2es.org/international/paris-
statement [http://perma.cc/Q376-8UKJ]; We Mean Business Coalition, 
supra note 55. 
57. See Jonathan Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421, 450-51 (2011) (arguing against the use of the 
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Second, proceeding with rulemaking for greenhouse gases under 
the CAA avoided a gap that might have been created post-Mass. v. 
EPA in the absence of agency action. The 2011 Supreme Court case 
American Electric Power v. Connecticut made clear that the effect of 
Mass. v. EPA was to preempt federal common law litigation relating 
to greenhouse gas emissions.58 In American Electric Power, a case 
initiated before the ruling in Mass. v. EPA, a coalition of eight states, 
New York City, and three land trusts sued the nation’s biggest 
utilities under public nuisance theories, seeking to enjoin emissions 
reductions. There, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that 
although the EPA had not yet exercised its authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases, recognition of that authority by the Court in Mass. 
v. EPA was sufficient to preempt the claims.59 Without the 
Administration’s subsequent rulemaking, the impact of American 
Electric Power’s preemption ruling would have been a more 
consequential limitation on common law in the climate context.   
Third, the Administration’s CAA agenda carried significance in 
the Framework Convention context and for the U.S. posture 
approaching COP21. This is reflected in the preamble to the Clean 
Power Plan final rule, released within months of the Conference, 
which explains that the “rule establishes…the foundation for longer 
term GHG emission reduction strategies necessary to address climate 
change and, in so doing, confirms the international leadership of the 
U.S. in the global effort to address climate change.”60 Taken together, 
the CAA rules are central to the President’s effort to reassert an 
effective and credible leadership role for the U.S. in international 
climate negotiations. Further, this work provided a basis for the 
President to pursue bilateral climate agreements with China, India, 
and Brazil, widely viewed as important to shifting the dynamic that 
prevented U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol. 
The statement in the Clean Power Plan preamble also reflects 
recognition that climate change will require further decarbonization 
than this rule alone can achieve. Policy critiques of this centerpiece 
regulation range, predictably, from assertions that the rule is too 
aggressive, to worries the rule does not do enough. Among those 
arguing the Clean Power Plan is too aggressive are coal companies 
and states who filed lawsuits challenging the rule even before it was 
final, hoping for (but failing to obtain) preliminary injunctions on the 
 
Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases and favoring approaches 
that focus on fostering on technological innovation). 
58. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S.Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
59. Id. 
60. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Red. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
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rulemaking.61 Among those scrutinizing the efficacy of the Clean 
Power Plan as a climate change mitigation measure are climate policy 
advocates tracking the prospects for climate stabilization.62 The World 
Resources Institute, for instance, projects that “to get on track… [for 
the] 2025 target of 26–28 percent below 2005 levels, the United States 
will need to go beyond actions taken to date.”63 Although the 
Administration still projects confidence in these numbers, some 
estimates show these approaches falling short of the INDC, in the 
range of 16-23 percent.64 Sources evaluating the ambitions of INDCs 
have rated the U.S. as “medium,” suggesting it should be higher.65 
There may be additional possibilities for further GHG reductions 
using existing legal authority. Recent legal analyses, for example, 
suggest there is alternative authority under CAA § 115 for a 
nationwide carbon emissions reduction plan like the Clean Power 
Plan, developed under § 111, but this has not yet been pursued.66 
Likewise, a promising source of additional reductions would be 
methane standards for existing oil and gas wells, but to date there is 
no certain indication that the EPA will develop these rules.  
The force of the Administration’s CAA agenda will be an 
important aspect of Obama’s climate legacy, but it will not be the 
only factor shaping perspectives on the President’s commitment to 
the UNFCCC’s core aspiration. Seemingly mixed messages from the 
Administration have been hard for observers to reconcile with the 
commitment that seems to underlie the CAA rules. Three 
controversial issues in particular have troubled advocates of strong 
climate policy during the Obama Presidency, and only in recent 
months have they begun to resolve.  
The highest profile and most contentious among these has been 
the Keystone XL pipeline. This infrastructure project was 
 
61. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
62. USA, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (Sept. 4, 2015), available at 
http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa.html 
[http://perma.cc/3UM9-Q94Z]. 
63. Karl Hausker et al., Delivering on the U.S. Climate Commitment: A 10-
Point Plan Toward a Low-Carbon Future 2 (World Res. Institute, 
Working Paper, 2015). 
64. Id. at 4. 
65. See Tracking INDCs, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, available at 
http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html [http://perma.cc/ZBV5-
DNNT] (providing an assessment of mitigation contributions to the 
Paris Agreement.). 
66. See Michael Burger, et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Under § 115 of the Clean Air Act (Jan. 2016), 
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/legal_pathways_to_reducing_ghg_emissions_under_section_1
15_of_the_caa.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG9V-4H9J]. 
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controversial because it is designed to transport oil from Canadian tar 
sands, known to be highly carbon-intensive, to the Texas coast for 
export.67 Some climate activists regarded it as a sort of litmus test on 
the President’s commitment to climate mitigation.68 Initially, the 
State Department reported the environmental impact of the Keystone 
pipeline would not be significant, and the Administration’s seeming 
openness to project approval prompted grassroots organizations to 
rally tens of thousands to the Capitol in protest.69 President Obama 
vetoed a bill that would have approved the Keystone XL pipeline, but 
the project was still officially under State Department review.70 
Ultimately, toward the end of 2015, the President ended the multi-
year controversy by rejecting the permit application.71 The Record of 
Decision (ROD) shows the Administration considered the pipeline to 
have international symbolic importance, noting “it is strategically 
important for the U.S. to continue to play a leadership role in the 
worldwide fight against climate change.”72 The ROD acknowledged 
that “many will see it as a test of U.S. willingness to take significant 
and difficult decisions as part of a broader effort to address climate 
change.”73 
A second example of what has been widely seen as mixed 
messaging from the President is his stance on Arctic oil and gas 
exploration. The Administration’s approvals of exploratory oil drilling 
 
67. See generally New Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
available at http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov 
[http://perma.cc/3QVM-59TP] (providing information about the 
Keystone XL Pipeline). 
68. Scott Horsley, Keystone Greens See Pipeline Test For Obama, NPR 
(Feb. 20, 2014, 4:00 PM), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2014/02/20/280255167/keystone-greens-see-
pipeline-as-crucial-test-for-obama [http://perma.cc/Q37P-AGEN]. 
69. Kristine Delkus & James White, Application of Transcanada Keystone 
Pipeline, L.P. for a Presidential Permit Authorizing the Construction, 
Connection, Operation, and Maintenance of Pipeline Facilities for the 
Importation of Crude Oil to be Located at the United States-Canada 
Border, U.S. DEP’T STATE 2 (May 4, 2012), http://keystonepipeline-
xl.state.gov/documents/organization/189504.pdf 
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70. Juliet Eilperin & Katie Zezima, Obama vetoes Keystone XL bill, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/02/24/keystone-xl-bill-a-k-a-veto-bait-heads-to-
presidents-desk/ [https://perma.cc/8UBG-Z5J7]. 
71. Record of Decision and National Interest Determination: TransCanada 
Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Application for Presidential Permit, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE (Nov. 3, 2015), available at https://keystonepipeline-
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permits in the Chukchi Seas were confusing at best, and 
environmental groups have been in litigation against the Department 
of the Interior for years.74 At a time when the President seemed keen 
to reduce GHG emissions via the CAA why would the Administration 
encourage new exploitation of fossil fuels better left in place?75  
A third point of inconsistency has been the Administration’s 
failure to revisit decades-old policies for coal leasing on federal public 
lands–the source of roughly forty percent of the nation’s coal 
production. Coal leasing on federal lands has seemed at clear cross-
purposes with the goals of CAA regulations curbing emissions from 
coal-fired power plants. In the final year of the second term, this 
conflict is receiving the Administration’s attention–in January 2016, 
the Department of the Interior announced a moratorium on new coal 
leasing and the launch of a comprehensive review of the federal coal 
program.76 
Alongside these controversies, there have been clear areas of 
achievement apart from the CAA rulemaking that demonstrate the 
President’s commitments to domestic climate action, such as support 
for renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Climate Action Plan 
states a goal of doubling renewable energy and increasing energy 
efficiency by twenty percent in commercial and industrial buildings by 
2020.77 The Bureau of Land management in the Department of the 
Interior, for example, has developed Solar Energy Zones on public 
land that will be able to support infrastructure to power over seven 
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million homes.78 Time will tell how the Administration’s decisions 
across varied contexts will be judged together as a climate legacy. 
III. Conclusion 
The President’s domestic climate action uses existing law and 
does, at minimum, two things relative to the international law 
context. First, it fulfills the longstanding obligation for “national 
policies” under the Convention, and second, it makes U.S. efforts to 
lead on the international stage more credible. A third function, 
particularly applicable to the CAA regulatory agenda, may be to 
provide a basis for the President to enter in a new binding climate 
agreement. According to international law Professor David Wirth, 
laws “already in place domestically,” including those “undertaken by 
the executive branch unilaterally,” provide “sufficiently firm legal 
footing that the President can confidently make parallel legally 
binding international commitments that track those domestic 
undertakings.”79 Likewise, Professor Daniel Bodansky concludes that, 
“depending on its contents, the president might be able to join the 
Paris agreement on the basis of existing constitutional, statutory, 
and/or treaty authority, without submitting it to the Senate or 
Congress for approval.”80 In these ways, the Obama Administration’s 
Clean Air Act rulemaking is central to the climate change legacy that 
will emerge in time, as well as to the present and future U.S. 
negotiating posture and ability to meet international obligations for 
climate change mitigation.  
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